seano77 said:
Yes, I'm saying we have an external source of morality (i.e. God) which defines how we think of right and wrong. Without this, you can not plausibly state that murder is wrong. Because if truth is relative then if someone thinks that murder is right, you have no way of defending your beleif that murder is wrong.
For Proof:
http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=Id2Ik4whVr8
Ravi Zacharias is a brilliant speaker but I don't think you should elevate his oratory to the status of proof. Here are some problems with what he is saying:
(1)
On the argument from evil: His rebuttal is terrible. Given his graduate training Zacharias should show more awareness of the logical structure of a proof by contradiction. All one needs to do in order to wield the argument is
assume a certain definition of evil provided by the church (or similar), not
vindicate nor
prove it. The problem for most religions is that evil
as defined by them is present in the world. The argument from evil simply suggests that it seems to be within god's power (and desire), should they exist, to eliminate such evil. There are certainly ways out of this dillemma, but Zacharias' "solution" is not one of them.
(2)
"If you have a moral law, then you need a law giver". This is pure equivocation on some readings. The problem is that the rhetoric we use when describing our legal systems has made it into scientific and moral discourse. Certainly, in the context of a society you cannot have a law without a law giver. But to then assert that we must have a giver of moral laws is to missappropriate the analogy. Undoubtedly theistic literature will often use "moral law" in the sense that a law maker exists, but it is often the case that when people refer to 'moral law' they are really talking about 'objective moral facts'.
Once we start talking about facts we needn't do so with recourse to a 'fact maker'. Why is it true (/a fact/ the case) that there is a pen on my desk? Simply because a set of circumstances obtain which involve a pen existing on the desk in question. Nothing more, nothing less (in my opinion). Many have suggested that moral claims regarding good and evil may be made true in virtue of similar 'moral facts' which may derive from logic, reason and empirical facts. Of course, I am a relativist and so do not agree with these claims (I am one of those who would deny the truth, though not the usefulness, of morality all together).
(3)
The trouble with law makers: An important question arises if one asserts that the only plausible basis for morality is divine command. The question is this - is it possible that god could have chosen a different moral law? If it
is possible then you are left with a form of moral relativism because moral truth is relative to god's (possibly different) command. If it is
not possible then we have a further question - why is it that it was only possible for god to dictate a certain conception of morality? In order to answer this question it seems to me that you need some fact, or set of facts, which explain why it was necessary for god to pick a certain conception of morality. Moral law is then explained not by god's command, but by this further set of facts which explains the necessity of god's command. Thus it seems that the moral facts are what is important, not the law maker as such.
