KFunk said:
It seems as though a lot of equivocation goes on in the use of the term 'universal'. Here are two importantly different uses, where I use '*' to indicate different useage ('universal', versus 'universal-star'):
(1) A moral principle can be universal in that it applies to all people, e.g. everyone should have the right to free speech.
(2) A moral principle can be universal* in that it is universally held, e.g. it might be the case that everybody believes that it is wrong to kill.
Molyneux claims that "morals are a set of rules claiming to accurately and consistently identify preferred human behaviours". My understanding is that a 'preferred behavior' is a behavior that the individual holding the preference would prefer others to engage in. For example, one might prefer that people not sing loudly in the middle of a funeral. No doubt, an individual can universally [in the sense of (1)] prefer a behavior by preferring, of all people, that they engage in that behavior. I do not doubt that such preferences can exist and, more importantly, I think that 'should' statements, when made, often imply this kind of universal preference --> which makes me wonder why this sense of universal even needs to be tacked onto 'PB', suggesting perhaps that 'universal*' was intended. I should here note that the fact that a preference is universal [in the sense of (1)] does not make it true in any objective sense. In other words, its being universal does not ensure that there is any objective fact external to your preferences that makes it true.
Now consider the other option: universal* preferred behavior (U*PB). At a longshot one might be able to argue that there exists some behavior which is universally* preferred. But to suggest that there exists a complete and consistent set of moral rules which are universally* preferred is rediculous. It is the existence of U*PB which I feel one can safetly deny, rather than UPB which is rather uncontroversial. If Molyneux advocates U*PB then I feel that he does so incorrectly.
In the sense of (2), the only thing that we have to accept as a UPB is that truth is preferable to falsehood (because arguing that UPB doesn't exist is itself a statement of preference). Everything else is up for debate.
In preferring truth to falsehood, it can be argued that effectively, this is arguing that we should use the scientific method (which is objective) to seek the truth, and that this is a preferable behaviour. Because if you seek the truth, it is logical that you want any theory to be: (a) universal, (b) logical, (c) empirically verifiable, (d) reproducible and (e) as simple as possible
As for the 'complete set of consistent moral rules that apply universally', I think that's what we're actually arguing about now! It's false moral propositions that UPB is designed to disprove, if that makes sense.
So yeah, its not to say that everyone actually
does prefer no murdering to murdering (there may always exist some crazy individual that wants to murder), but it is to say that those people who say that "murder is ok" are proven wrong by the use of the scientific method. And thus, the 'principle' allowing murder is reduced to mere opinion or personal preference.
KFunk said:
I don't understand how the objectivity/measureability of actions which stem from moral decisions make morality objective.
I'm not the best at explaining this stuff and its pretty confusing, so let me take another stab at showing where the 'absolute realm of truths' of morality comes from. And then I'll have a look at your analogy.
Imagine this interaction between 2 people:
person A: Morality is only relative
person B: Relative to what?
person A: Relative to oneself
person B now decides that 'relative to himself' it'd be a great idea to kick person A's ass
person A now decides that 'relative to himself' it's not ok for person B to kick his ass
Now how would these two people decide which decision is correct? Whatever this standard is, that's where the 'absolute realm of truth' lies (or as dhj put it earlier, the big old book of morality). The alternative is "might makes right", which I'm pretty sure you guys don't agree with.
Now instead of "relative to oneself" you could try and say "relative to society", which is where you get these euphemism-type phrases like the "social good" or "community good" from, but I think we need to point out here that morally, "society" doesn't exist. Society is a concept, whereas the only actual moral agents are humans. So just to reiterate what I was saying before, moral rules apply to people, not concepts.
Now its possible to have a personal preference for things but that doesn't necessarily say anything useful or solve anything. I'm perfectly entitled to the opinion that rocks fall upwards, but I'd be wrong to say it, and I consider this in much the same way that I'd think if someone said that theft is ok. So yes we do have our own feelings about what is right and wrong, but ultimately this isn't the sole determinant of what is right and wrong. For our personal opinions and preferences to become actual moral rules/principles, they need to be subjected to the scientific method. (dhj, this is what I was talking about when I was saying that your moral theories need to be subjected to the scientific method, and as long as you accept majority rule is valid, then I think your theory is only a personal preference and not a valid statement of moral rule or principle)
Oh yeah, I think the 'absolute realm of truths' effectively requires us to only have "freedom from", rather than "freedom to". (negative rights rather than positive rights) Because obviously people have the "freedom from" getting their ass kicked
Bit of a random question (to either KFunk or dhj, or whoever is still following the thread):
When you say that "morality is subjective or relative to oneself" - would you say this statement is objectively true?
KFunk said:
Consider the following analogy:
Suppose, for example, that there is a French woman whom I consider beautiful. One day I am sitting in a cafe, munching on a croissant, when she walks by, causing me to become 'hot and aroused'. Note now that this state of being 'hot and aroused' can be measured objectively through various physiological and psychological tests. The effects of the woman's beauty are objective and measureable. Does this then entail that the woman is objectively beautiful?
I believe the answer to be in the negative - that beauty is subjective, not objective. Other individuals from different backgrounds - cultural, religious, whatever - may not find the woman beautiful at all, and some may even find her unattractive or ugly. My view is that moral beliefs are similarly subjective and socially constructed.
My question to you is then: how is morality any different from beauty in the above case? How can the fact that "the effects of our moral decisions are objective and measurable" make morality objective?
Not really sure how to go about answering this, so here are a few:
1. Getting aroused by some hot chick is an involuntary reaction. Morality deals with situations where you have a choice to do something. If you didn't have the opportunity to NOT do something, how can you be immoral for doing it? I don't think your analogy is a 'choice', let alone a moral choice.
2. Perhaps you're not really being fair with your logical connections here? In saying that you can objectively measure your reaction to this french woman, maybe you're really just objectively proving "that
you find her attractive", not that she is objectively attractive.
I think there's a difference between one person finding a woman attractive and this woman actually
being objectively attractive.
3. This is more a situation of preference than of moral choices. There are actions that we hold to have no real moral status. Like preferring chocolate icecream to strawberry icecream. It's not immoral or moral, its just... whatever flavour icecream you like.