Port Arthur Killer Martin Bryant & the "Right To Die" (1 Viewer)

[_dhj_]

It's for this reason that I do not understand why ANYONE advocates the death penalty.

From the offender's perspective, life imprisonment may be the worse punishment when the offender is actually experiencing it. But once he is in that predicament his experience becomes irrelevant. I think it really turns on two things - the deterrence effect of the death penalty compared to life imprisonment and the outcome that's most satisfactory to the victim and the community once the offender is found guilty. The problem with the death penalty when considering those criteria is that its effect as deterrence and as satisfaction is far more unpredictable and variable among individuals.

 

[Not-That-Bright]

So you want to see him punished, fair enough, but where do you draw your line serius? iamsickofyear12 seems to want the most painful experience possible for him for the rest of his life, do you support that? Perhaps just a cheap/cost effective punishment? Maybe for some reason you think what we've got now is fine?

 

[_dhj_]

Serius' position is quite a reasonable one to take. But I think Martin Bryant, as an individual, had a significant impact on Australian society for he was the catalyst for the introduction of the gun laws. Their merits can be endlessly debated - personally I think they have and will save far more than 35 lives, and the vast majority of Australians would probably agree - although some (such as Serius) may not.

 

[KFunk]

Imo murderers, rapists and pedophiles are three crimes that can never be reformed.

Certainly, they constitute difficult groups, but it has been done. Also, I would ask you, does punishment make sense if free will doesn't make sense?

 

[SunkistAngel]

You do realise he murdered 35 people right? he was sentenced to life without parole....Imo murderers, rapists and pedophiles are three crimes that can never be reformed.

In short, reform = good for petty crime, just not for homocidal maniacs who slay 35 people in cold blood.

You probably chose these three crimes because in ourt society right now today, our values pin these crimes as the worst, however socities' values are forever changing and in a few centuries perhaps these crimes will not be considered to worst offences to a particular culture or society of people.

I don't believe that we should make generalisations such as this, assuming that murderers, rapists and paedophiles can never be 'reformed'. That is the kind of ignorance i was talking about, refusing to take responsibilty for someone else's actions thorugh pride, ignorance or laziness because 'society doesnt have time for them or wants to help them'.

Ultimately, people are punished different ways for different reasons as they commit crimes, but they also commit the crime for different reasons. It is here that the legal system and general society's views are in fault; you may generalise how you deal with people who commit crimes ie. most popular is to be put in gaol or detention, but what needs to be looked at is why the person committed the crime ie illness. I know this is taken into account at times but not nearly enough as it should be.

Having the perspective that these people 'won't ever be deemed normal by the majority of society' is dismissing the fact that they could be and just basically making a society turn a selfish blind eye or take the easy way out from helping people who are clearly asking for it. If it is through murder? Even more reason to get them proper help and being consistent until the most has been done to help.

Society is letting down it's people through ignorance to protect pride, which i believe is equally as or even more so selfish and harmful long term than killing innocents.

 

[_dhj_]

One has to wonder which is worse - ignorance or naivety? Probably ignorance because it's an evolved form, whereas naivety can still evolve into a more constructive worldview.

 

[Serius]

So you want to see him punished, fair enough, but where do you draw your line serius? iamsickofyear12 seems to want the most painful experience possible for him for the rest of his life, do you support that? Perhaps just a cheap/cost effective punishment? Maybe for some reason you think what we've got now is fine?

I am not sure where to draw the line, right now i am happy that someone else has drawn it for me. A big part of prison is keeping currently unreformed people out of society who could harm it. Keeping a homicidal criminal off the streets seems like a good idea to me. Whilst i can understand iamsickofyr12's view, i don't really think its necessary, life behind bars is bad enough as it is..

Certainly, they constitute difficult groups, but it has been done. Also, I would ask you, does punishment make sense if free will doesn't make sense?

My current viewpoint is one of active human agency. From this perspective, punishment does indeed make sense.

You probably chose these three crimes because in ourt society right now today, our values pin these crimes as the worst, however socities' values are forever changing and in a few centuries perhaps these crimes will not be considered to worst offences to a particular culture or society of people.

I don't believe that. Murder has always been one of the worst crimes, rape has always been reprehensible[although not always a crime depending on who is in charge] and pedophilia has always been seen as a disgusting abuse of power.

I don't believe that we should make generalisations such as this, assuming that murderers, rapists and paedophiles can never be 'reformed'. That is the kind of ignorance i was talking about, refusing to take responsibilty for someone else's actions thorugh pride, ignorance or laziness because 'society doesnt have time for them or wants to help them'.

I said they can never be reformed for simplicity's sake. Maybe once in a blue moon its possible with enormous expenditure. From what i have learned in my course, i am of the opinion that in the vast majority of these cases reform is not viable and will probably fail no matter how much you spend. 2nd year psych, so hopefully you will see the logic in deferring to me on this.

Ultimately, people are punished different ways for different reasons as they commit crimes, but they also commit the crime for different reasons. It is here that the legal system and general society's views are in fault; you may generalise how you deal with people who commit crimes ie. most popular is to be put in gaol or detention, but what needs to be looked at is why the person committed the crime ie illness. I know this is taken into account at times but not nearly enough as it should be.

Having the perspective that these people 'won't ever be deemed normal by the majority of society' is dismissing the fact that they could be and just basically making a society turn a selfish blind eye or take the easy way out from helping people who are clearly asking for it. If it is through murder? Even more reason to get them proper help and being consistent until the most has been done to help.

Society is letting down it's people through ignorance to protect pride, which i believe is equally as or even more so selfish and harmful long term than killing innocents.

That is a foolish viewpoint. Prison isn't just about punishment, its about keeping criminals off the streets, and reforming the ones we can. People don't commit crimes because they are sick[well some do, but most dont] they commit them because they are selfish assholes looking to get ahead in life, or maybe they are ambitious enough to rob a bank. Ambition isn't an illness is it? Maybe they are just bad people who don't give a shit about others, or they take pleasure in causing other people pain. Either way its not what i would classify an illness[maybe they are sick "socially" but thats it]

 

[KFunk]

I said they can never be reformed for simplicity's sake. Maybe once in a blue moon its possible with enormous expenditure. From what i have learned in my course, i am of the opinion that in the vast majority of these cases reform is not viable and will probably fail no matter how much you spend. 2nd year psych, so hopefully you will see the logic in deferring to me on this.

Keep in mind the difference between possibility and practical possibility. If it is possible to do so we can still argue that, in an ideal world, we should aim at criminal reform. Undoubtedly there are many difficult cases but, for example, a clinical psychologist described to us a case of a hardcore crim. (murderer I think; tats and all the rest) reformed quite successfully and is now a happy family man, raising kids.

Also, and I know it's quite a different kettle of fish, some studies with juvenile offenders gives some cause for optimism (see attachment if you're interested - the results are quite impressive). Even more impressive are theresults of cost-benefit analyses for this particular juvenile reform program: "Combined criminal justice system and victim benefits totalled $US13.45 for every dollar spent." In any case, my primary argument for rehabilitation is on moral rather than practical grounds.

Also, on human agency: given the moral implications that arise if humans do not, in fact, have the capacity to make decisions in a way which confers responsibility, don't you think that you should have to make an argument for humans as responsible agents?

 

[KFunk]

That is a foolish viewpoint. Prison isn't just about punishment, its about keeping criminals off the streets, and reforming the ones we can. People don't commit crimes because they are sick[well some do, but most dont] they commit them because they are selfish assholes looking to get ahead in life, or maybe they are ambitious enough to rob a bank. Ambition isn't an illness is it?

Did they choose to be ambitious/selfish any more than someone chooses to contract tuberculosis? Are behavioral tendencies (e.g. towards greed or violence) really just matters of personal choice? As far as I can tell illness, especially in the realms of mental health, depends a great deal on social/cultural values. If we're dealing with a spectrum then how do we pick the cut-off point which demarcates sick from well?

 

[_dhj_]

Did they choose to be ambitious/selfish any more than someone chooses to contract tuberculosis? Are behavioral tendencies (e.g. towards greed or violence) really just matters of personal choice? As far as I can tell illness, especially in the realms of mental health, depends a great deal on social/cultural values. If we're dealing with a spectrum then how do we pick the cut-off point which demarcates sick from well?

The social/cultural values of 'natural justice' that the community holds and its ignorance aren't chosen either - nor are the bureaucratic acts that culminate to enforce 'natural justice'. Still, the values can be influenced (albeit negatively) by mass media through a symbiotic relationship that pushes the values to the extremes. In this context, the objective reality of agency and responsibility become irrelevant. The community, like the spectators at a gladiatorial arena, needs to be satiated.

 

[KFunk]

The social/cultural values of 'natural justice' that the community holds and its ignorance aren't chosen either - nor are the bureaucratic acts that culminate to enforce 'natural justice'. Still, the values can be influenced (albeit negatively) by mass media through a symbiotic relationship that pushes the values to the extremes. In this context, the objective reality of agency and responsibility become irrelevant. The community, like the spectators at a gladiatorial arena, needs to be satiated.

I don't see why it should become irrelevant. You say 'needs' as though it is an insatiable bloodlust. Are humans not capable of change? The fact is, if we insert into our system of beliefs the idea that we cannot properly attribute responsibility for actions then certain moral beliefs, if held, compel us to aim for rehabilitation rather than punishment. Such a fact is only irrelevant in this type of discussion if we are to consign ourselves to the mob and avoid the possibility of changing our habits (possibly for the better). As long as some people are capable of being persuaded by this argument I'm not sure how you can speak of irrelevance.

Also, keep in mind that a lot of the moral push towards rehabilitation (in the case that we deny responsibility) comes from within this very system of natural justice that you refer to. A very real, and, dare I say, very relevant, dillema arises from consideration of such a fact.

 

[ObjectsInSpace]

Nitschke is like Nietzche.















A complete moron. I'd sooner support euthanasia for terminal patients than for convicted felons.

 

[_dhj_]

I don't see why it should become irrelevant. You say 'needs' as though it is an insatiable bloodlust. Are humans not capable of change? The fact is, if we insert into our system of beliefs the idea that we cannot properly attribute responsibility for actions then certain moral beliefs, if held, compel us to aim for rehabilitation rather than punishment. Such a fact is only irrelevant in this type of discussion if we are to consign ourselves to the mob and avoid the possibility of changing our habits (possibly for the better). As long as some people are capable of being persuaded by this argument I'm not sure how you can speak of irrelevance.

If the predominant moral framework condemns certain activities as criminal and deserving of punishment then I don't see the value of changing that moral framework merely for the sake of removing punishment.

Also, keep in mind that a lot of the moral push towards rehabilitation (in the case that we deny responsibility) comes from within this very system of natural justice that you refer to. A very real, and, dare I say, very relevant, dillema arises from consideration of such a fact.

I think rehabilitation relies as much on the concept of responsibility as punishment, for you cannot rehabilitate a person who has not committed a 'wrong' in the first place. In fact it is probably more reliant on the concept on responsibility than punishment, for it relies on the individual's realisation of moral wrongness of the act per se, and not on positive deterrants on top of the moral wrongness.

 

[_dhj_]

Nitschke is like Nietzche.

Isn't that a bit generous?

 

[KFunk]

If the predominant moral framework condemns certain activities as criminal and deserving of punishment then I don't see the value of changing that moral framework merely for the sake of removing punishment.

A lot of our moral framework consists of conditionals - 'If X happens then Y should be done'. What I am proposing is the idea that some people support the moral rule 'If x is not repsonsible for act A, then x should not be punished on account of A's occurence'. If we introduce the fact that 'no x can properly be held responsible for any action A' then we have the potential for major inconsistencies. Would you advocate that we accept inconsistencies of the form 'We should do X and we should do not-X' once we become aware of them?

I think rehabilitation relies as much on the concept of responsibility as punishment, for you cannot rehabilitate a person who has not committed a 'wrong' in the first place. In fact it is probably more reliant on the concept on responsibility than punishment, for it relies on the individual's realisation of moral wrongness of the act per se, and not on positive deterrants on top of the moral wrongness.

Note that in the absence of free will actions can still be bad without the agents themselves being bad. The idea is that a certain individual happens to be a 'commiter of bad acts', which is not the same thing as the individual being bad. The role of medicine for someone who happens to be sick is a strong analogy (even stronger when we take into account infectious disease and quarantine --> keeping them isolated to avoid further damage to greater society). Our justification for rehabilitation needn't rely on responsibility.

 

[_dhj_]

A lot of our moral framework consists of conditionals - 'If X happens then Y should be done'. What I am proposing is the idea that some people support the moral rule 'If x is not repsonsible for act A, then x should not be punished on account of A's occurence'. If we introduce the fact that 'no x can properly be held responsible for any action A' then we have the potential for major inconsistencies. Would you advocate that we accept inconsistencies of the form 'We should do X and we should do not-X' once we become aware of them?

I couldn't follow the last part of that. Do you mind rephrasing it?

Note that in the absence of free will actions can still be bad without the agents themselves being bad. The idea is that a certain individual happens to be a 'commiter of bad acts', which is not the same thing as the individual themself being bad. The role of medicine for someone who happens to be sick is a strong analogy (even stronger when we take into account infectious disease and quarantine for the sake of society --> keeping them isolated to avoid further damage to greater society). Our justification for rehabilitation needn't rely on responsibility.

I think if we successfully get rid of some falsehoods in the minds of the community the whole system will collapse, not merely because of what the truth itself entails, but because most people aren't intelligent enough to understand the whole truth, so they will merely take in part of the truth and part of the falsehood to form a framework that is inconsistent and dangerous.

I'm sceptical about the usefulness of the medicine analogy. In using medicine, the person relieves himself. It is a field that grew from individual demands. On the other hand, the murderer or rapist himself does not suffer from the act if from his perspective, the moral wrongness of it is outweighed by the desire to commit the act in the particular circumstances. Rather, it is the community that suffers and needs to be remedied by deterrence, protection from further acts (by the person being locked up), and compensation in the form of 'just deserts' (particularly for the victim).

 

[KFunk]

I couldn't follow the last part of that. Do you mind rephrasing it?

Sure, no problem. Another way of saying the same thing is to start by considering the following set of moral principles (with 'x' for a subject and 'A' for an action, arbitrary in each case):

• If x is not repsonsible for act A, then x should not be punished on account of A's occurence
• There exists some action A such that if x performs A then x should be punished
• No x can properly be held responsible for any action A

The problem, of course, is that they yield inconsistency where we are obligated to both 'punish x' and to 'not punish x' if they perform an act which we deem punishable. The problem is simply one of inconsistency. What I wanted to ask you is whether you are willing to accept inconsistency as a feature of a moral system.

I think if we successfully get rid of some falsehoods in the minds of the community the whole system will collapse, not merely because of what the truth itself entails, but because most people aren't intelligent enough to understand the whole truth, so they will merely take in part of the truth and part of the falsehood to form a framework that is inconsistent and dangerous.

I'm sceptical about the usefulness of the medicine analogy. In using medicine, the person relieves himself. It is a field that grew from individual demands. On the other hand, the murderer or rapist himself does not suffer from the act if from his perspective, the moral wrongness of it is outweighed by the desire to commit the act in the particular circumstances. Rather, it is the community that suffers and needs to be remedied by deterrence, protection from further acts (by the person being locked up), and compensation in the form of 'just deserts' (particularly for the victim).

I agree with the notion that an inability for some people to comprehend certain truths poses a problem. I geuss the trick would be finding a way to promote this particular 'truth' without encouraging dangerous results.

I'll give you a more precise medical analogy --> a patient in the community with an infectious disease (e.g. tuberculosis). They are isolated and given treatment in order to prevent 'bad' things from befalling both the patient and society. The other key thing is that the person is not properly reponsible for the fact that they are sick. The idea is that a criminal doesn't choose to acquire violent character trait and, subsequently, comit violent acts any more than a patient chooses to acquire a pathogen and infect others. Mind you, I will certainly admit that this analogy is not a perfect one.

 

[_dhj_]

Sure, no problem. Another way of saying the same thing is to start by considering the following set of moral principles (with 'x' for a subject and 'A' for an action, arbitrary in each case):

• If x is not repsonsible for act A, then x should not be punished on account of A's occurence
• There exists some action A such that if x performs A then x should be punished
• No x can properly be held responsible for any action A

The problem, of course, is that they yield inconsistency where we are obligated to both 'punish x' and to 'not punish x' if they perform an act which we deem punishable. The problem is simply one of inconsistency. What I wanted to ask you is whether you are willing to accept inconsistency as a feature of a moral system.

Thanks for the clarification. I don't think whether I personally am willing to accept inconsistency is relevant. The truth as a whole is consistent. The moral frame as a whole is somewhat consistent to the extent where inconsistency is acceptable and negligible. When you combine part of the truth (point 3) expressed in terms of moral discourse (the concept of 'responsiblity'), then the inconsistency may be problematic for the community to accept. Where the extent of the inconsistency is unacceptable to certain individuals in the community, few individuals will actually accept all three points.

I agree with the notion that an inability for some people to comprehend certain truths poses a problem. I geuss the trick would be finding a way to promote this particular 'truth' without encouraging dangerous results.

I'll give you a more precise medical analogy --> a patient in the community with an infectious disease (e.g. tuberculosis). They are isolated and given treatment in order to prevent 'bad' things from befalling both the patient and society. The other key thing is that the person is not properly reponsible for the fact that they are sick. The idea is that a criminal doesn't choose to acquire violent character trait and, subsequently, comit violent acts any more than a patient chooses to acquire a pathogen and infect others. Mind you, I will certainly admit that this analogy is not a perfect one.

I don't think the person 'deserves' it either. But even so, 'just deserts' is a logical destination for the moral code through societal evolution. Let's assume that if an action, such as murder, is detrimental to society, there should be 'treatment' to prevent the act. Now, if act has already occurred, the damage is done. The treatment needs to be affected before the happening of the act. But society can't identify who is most likely to commit murder and forcibly treat them. So there are only two ways of preventing the act - through affirming that the act is wrong, and through deterrent. The latter is most realistic to implement through coersive means - the threat of incarceration for whoever commits the act, the former is better dealt with through creating a religious code (which is corrolary to the deterrent for it promises the rewards of an afterlife in return for adhering to the code). Of course, the fact that an action is detrimental to society is by itself a reasonable basis for labelling it as wrong (at least from the community's point of view). Furthermore, the fact that people who committed the act are locked up (because of the need for deterrence), from the community's point of view deepens the wrongness of the act - 'surely they're locked up for a reason'.

 

[KFunk]

Thanks for the clarification. I don't think whether I personally am willing to accept inconsistency is relevant. The truth as a whole is consistent. The moral frame as a whole is somewhat consistent to the extent where inconsistency is acceptable and negligible. When you combine part of the truth (point 3) expressed in terms of moral discourse (the concept of 'responsiblity'), then the inconsistency may be problematic for the community to accept. Where the extent of the inconsistency is unacceptable to certain individuals in the community, few individuals will actually accept all three points.

I agree with you on the last point, bringing us to the question: which point should we reject? The problem I have with rejecting point three is that its truth doesn't depend upon our acceptence (in the way many moral 'truths' may) because it rests on objective foundations. The general solution, to my mind, is to change the conditions for, and the motivations behind, punishment. You could use it as a deterent (as you have suggested) in certain cases or you could claim that people deserve to be punished if they commit wrong, even without being responsible for the actions (I am less inclined to agree to this latter point, as you have noticed). I don't oppose punishment in all cases, but I do oppose punishment which is particularly painful or prolonged. I find rehabilitation preferable (in an ideal sense) in most cases.

I don't think the person 'deserves' it either. But even so, 'just deserts' is a logical destination for the moral code through societal evolution. Let's assume that if an action, such as murder, is detrimental to society, there should be 'treatment' to prevent the act. Now, if act has already occurred, the damage is done. The treatment needs to be affected before the happening of the act. But society can't identify who is most likely to commit murder and forcibly treat them. So there are only two ways of preventing the act - through affirming that the act is wrong, and through deterrent. The latter is most realistic to implement through coersive means - the threat of incarceration for whoever commits the act, the former is better dealt with through creating a religious code (which is corrolary to the deterrent for it promises the rewards of an afterlife in return for adhering to the code). Of course, the fact that an action is detrimental to society is by itself a reasonable basis for labelling it as wrong (at least from the community's point of view). Furthermore, the fact that people who committed the act are locked up (because of the need for deterrence), from the community's point of view deepens the wrongness of the act - 'surely they're locked up for a reason'.

Replies to a few points:

(1) It may be a logical destination in statistical, evolutionary terms. However, that does not mean that we should tacitly accept rules derived in such a way. I suspect that one of the major challenges facing the international community will be trying to overcome a lot of rules which were derived in this way (we are not adapted for international interaction).

(2) Society can, in some cases, identify people who are more likely to commit violent acts like murder - check out the juvenile intervention study I posted in a reply to Serius (the results are fairly interesting/impressive)

(3) We naturally implement the technique of affirming the wrongness of actions. I would be very suprised if such moral prohibitions did not have an affect on the rate at which such actions are performed.

(4) Deterrent is a semi-decent reason (to my mind). However, I think we should avoid painful/prolonged punishments and deterrents, as mentioned above.

 

[_dhj_]

I agree with you on the last point, bringing us to the question: which point should we reject? The problem I have with rejecting point three is that its truth doesn't depend upon our acceptence (in the way many moral 'truths' may) because it rests on objective foundations. The general solution, to my mind, is to change the conditions for, and the motivations behind, punishment. You could use it as a deterent (as you have suggested) in certain cases or you could claim that people deserve to be punished if they commit wrong, even without being responsible for the actions (I am less inclined to agree to this latter point, as you have noticed). I don't oppose punishment in all cases, but I do oppose punishment which is particularly painful or prolonged. I find rehabilitation preferable (in an ideal sense) in most cases.

I agree on the distinction between moral 'truths' and objective truth. However, I don't feel that it is a valid general proposition, from a purely objective and consequential perspective, that ignorance of the objective truth leads to negative outcomes. On the contrary, ignorance of the truth may be beneficial on aggregate (economics and psychology would enlighten us on that issue).

I think we tend to underestimate the effectiveness of deterrence since we are generally law abiding citizens (education having a strong inverse correlation with rate of criminalisation). Now, think of a morally ambiguous crime with fairly poor levels of enforcement, such as illegal downloading of copyright music from the internet. I won't admit to anything, but it's fair to say that such laws would have far greater impact on changing behaviour if they could be widely enforced - if the deterrence effect is sufficiently strong. Another example is euthanasia, but I think this thread sufficiently touched on the issue.

Rehabilitation may be effective to an extent, but I think it's dangerous to overemphasise it. Sure, it may be an effective way to 'cure' the individual criminal - but only the individual criminal. At the same time, if we take away the emphasis on deterrence, the incidence of that crime within the broader community will increase. You have to take into account that, due to cost-constraints of the police force and the justice system, only about one prison sentence results from every thousand crimes committed. Therefore as primative as it sounds, there is a real need to 'make an example' of that offender.

Where rehabilitation is most appropriate, in conjunction with deterrence, is where the individual has a high chance of reoffending (although some would argue that the more cost-effective method is to lock them up for longer).

I agree with the other points to varying extents.