Hi to all who have been asking for help with this topic. I'm posting below a handout I used with my 3 Unit students who did the Thucydides Option in an earlier syllabus. It deals with the actions of the Delian League (DL) up to the period of the Thirty Years Peace and has references to sources interspersed throughout. I hope some of this will be of use to you. Later, I would like to post some notes on the establishment of the DL and Athenian methods of control of members.
Feel free to contact me for further help on Greek and Roman topics.
ACTIONS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE
“The way in which Athens reached her position of power was as follows.”
(Thucydides I.89.1)
I.89.-118 is an account of Athens’ imperial expansion inserted by Thuc into his history in order to explain the Spartan decision to declare war in 431. He believed this was caused by Sparta’s fears of further aggression by Athens, inspired by the fact that so much of Greece had fallen under Athenian control. Thuc relates the circumstances in which Athens found herself after the Persian Wars and how she used this situation to build up her power.
When the Athenians returned from evacuation (at Troezen, Salamis and Aegina) they also began to rebuild their city and walls, which had been devastated by the Persian occupation. The Spartans didn’t like the look of this and sent a delegation to Athens to dissuade them (Thuc I.90). They were apparently under pressure from their allies who were alarmed at the unprecedented size of the Ath. navy and their fighting spirit during the war. Their real motive was not revealed to the Athenians; instead, they gave a spurious reason for demolishing the walls. Themistocles instigated a plausible response to the Spartans and used delaying tactics to dupe them. The restoration of Athens was undertaken with great haste, and is so strongly emphasised by Thuc in this excursus that one must question what Athens’ intentions were: rearming, rebuilding, constructing a system of interconnected walls..? The fear and suspicion which intensified among her neighbours would have conveyed to them that Athens was aiming at imperialism (in less than 50 years, the period known as the Pentacontateia, this was achieved, culminating in the Peloponnesian War).
The first recorded action of the DL was the siege of EION, commanded by Kimon in autumn 477. It was taken from Persia in 476, its inhabitants enslaved. (I.98.1) This action was clearly a legitimate step in the war against Persia and must have caused no concern.
In 476 the DL captured SCYROS, inhabited by the Dolopians. The people were enslaved and an Ath. cleruchy established (Thuc I.98.2; Diod 11.60.2) The Athenians profited from the expedition but no objections came from the allies (they were actually quite pleased!!) ast the Dolopians were semi-barbaric, piratical people. When they were expelled, the Athenians were lauded: “they liberated the Aegean.” (Plut. Cim, 8.3-6) Establishment of a cleruchy guaranteed continued freedom from piracy.
The expedition against CARYSTUS, which was not under Persian rule, nor were the people piratical. They had apparently committed no action to merit attack.They had fought on the Persian side during the war, thus could expect little sympathy from the Greeks. The assumption was that Carystus was not part of the DL and that this expedition compelled her to join. She later appears on the tribute lists as a member, making regular money payments (ATL III.198; Gomme, H. Comm, I.281-82; Thuc. I.98.3). This is the first known case of compulsion being used to join the DL and it seemed to have approval. Carystus was unpopular because of its medizing, and it was considered unfair that she should benefit from DL efforts and protection from piracy unless she became a member.
This use of force/coercion/compulsion was to prove ominous in the future.
In 470, NAXOS, an original member, rebelled. No reason is given by Thuc. He merely says: “After this came the operations against Naxos, which had tried to defect from the Confederacy; it was brought down by siege. This was the first allied state which, in defiance of the covenant, was reduced to the status of a slave.. (I.98.4)
It is uncertain, but likely, that Naxos was forbidden a navy, thus they had to pay tribute. Perhaps a garrison was installed, or land confiscated, or a cleruchy settled on confiscated land (ATL III.156-7). Athens apparently acted with DL approval (see Kagan p.46): “Rebellion could not be allowed or the alliance would soon disintegrate" (p.46). Thuc uses the attack on Naxos for a general account of the change in the nature of the DL, clarifying the fact that Naxos was not the only state in rebellion, and that increasingly harsh treatment of rebels was the rule (Kagan p.46)
Rebellions occurred when members were unwilling or unable to pay tribute, supply ships, or do military service. Athens was strict about tribute collection and exaction of service.
The demeanour of the Athenian commanders also changed, mainly due to circumstances. “The Athenians were no longer equally pleasant as leaders. They no longer bahaved as equals on campaigns, and they found it easy to reduce states that had rebelled,” (Thuc I.99.2)
Rebellions and reductions provided a vicious circle for the allies. Each rebel state was forced to yield a fleet and pay tribute, becoming weaker while Athens grew proportionately stronger. “The Athenian fleet was increased by their payments, while whenever they themselves revolted, they set about the war without preparation and without experience.” (Thuc I.99.3)
Growing allied discontent must have been increased by Kimon’s great victory at EURYMEDON in 469. (Thuc I. 100.1; Plut. Cim 12-14; Diod. Sic. II.60-62). The victory was so decisive, damage so great. booty so considerable, that it led some allies to believe the DL was no longer necessary (Kagan p.47) The Athenians (perhaps correctly) continued as the Persians had not completely abandoned the Aegean. (DS II. 62) The allies became increasingly restive which required greater compulsion from Athens.
In 465, THASOS, a charter member, who was rich and powerful, revolted. (Thuc I.100.2) The causes were different to those of the Naxian revolt. A disagreement with Athens over trading stations on the Thracian coast and a mine there provoked this. As they were rich yields, their loss would be a great economic blow to Athens. Simultaneously, Athens was establishing a colony at ENNEA HODOI (“nine ways”)
Also called AMPHIPOLIS, it was located on a bend in the River Strymon which radiated from here in several directions. It was a DL undertaking and sensibly designed to be a strategic base against the Macedonians, and would also probably extend Athenian influence to Thasos which in turn, led to rebellion. (ATL III.258) The colony was abandoned after a serious defeat by the natives. Thasos withstood a siege for over 2 years, but was defeated and was compelled to surrender:
• Its walls
• Its ships
• The Thracian coast *Thuc I.101.3
• The mine
• They also had to pay an indemnity in the form of tribute (immediately!)
This was the harshest treatment yet imposed. It led to great profit for Athens, yet increased her unpopularity.
The situation of the alliance by 462 was, according to Diodorus Siculus: “In general, the Athenians were making great gains in power and no longer treated their allies with decency as they had done before; instead they ruled with arrogance and violence. For this reason most of the allies could not bear their harshness and spoke to one another of rebellion; some of them even disdained the League Council and acted according to their own wishes.” (DS II.70.3-4)
Implied independence and open defiance were impossible as long as Athens was not distracted. By 462, Athens was in a struggle with Sparta on the mainland. For 15 years Athens was involved in war on land and sea, from Egypt to the eastern Mediterranean to the Greek mainland. In such circumstances, some disaffection was inevitable (Kagan p.48). Under pressure of war and rebellion, Athens resorted to harsher means to assume control. The ultimate outcome of this was EMPIRE.
Feel free to contact me for further help on Greek and Roman topics.
ACTIONS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE
“The way in which Athens reached her position of power was as follows.”
(Thucydides I.89.1)
I.89.-118 is an account of Athens’ imperial expansion inserted by Thuc into his history in order to explain the Spartan decision to declare war in 431. He believed this was caused by Sparta’s fears of further aggression by Athens, inspired by the fact that so much of Greece had fallen under Athenian control. Thuc relates the circumstances in which Athens found herself after the Persian Wars and how she used this situation to build up her power.
When the Athenians returned from evacuation (at Troezen, Salamis and Aegina) they also began to rebuild their city and walls, which had been devastated by the Persian occupation. The Spartans didn’t like the look of this and sent a delegation to Athens to dissuade them (Thuc I.90). They were apparently under pressure from their allies who were alarmed at the unprecedented size of the Ath. navy and their fighting spirit during the war. Their real motive was not revealed to the Athenians; instead, they gave a spurious reason for demolishing the walls. Themistocles instigated a plausible response to the Spartans and used delaying tactics to dupe them. The restoration of Athens was undertaken with great haste, and is so strongly emphasised by Thuc in this excursus that one must question what Athens’ intentions were: rearming, rebuilding, constructing a system of interconnected walls..? The fear and suspicion which intensified among her neighbours would have conveyed to them that Athens was aiming at imperialism (in less than 50 years, the period known as the Pentacontateia, this was achieved, culminating in the Peloponnesian War).
The first recorded action of the DL was the siege of EION, commanded by Kimon in autumn 477. It was taken from Persia in 476, its inhabitants enslaved. (I.98.1) This action was clearly a legitimate step in the war against Persia and must have caused no concern.
In 476 the DL captured SCYROS, inhabited by the Dolopians. The people were enslaved and an Ath. cleruchy established (Thuc I.98.2; Diod 11.60.2) The Athenians profited from the expedition but no objections came from the allies (they were actually quite pleased!!) ast the Dolopians were semi-barbaric, piratical people. When they were expelled, the Athenians were lauded: “they liberated the Aegean.” (Plut. Cim, 8.3-6) Establishment of a cleruchy guaranteed continued freedom from piracy.
The expedition against CARYSTUS, which was not under Persian rule, nor were the people piratical. They had apparently committed no action to merit attack.They had fought on the Persian side during the war, thus could expect little sympathy from the Greeks. The assumption was that Carystus was not part of the DL and that this expedition compelled her to join. She later appears on the tribute lists as a member, making regular money payments (ATL III.198; Gomme, H. Comm, I.281-82; Thuc. I.98.3). This is the first known case of compulsion being used to join the DL and it seemed to have approval. Carystus was unpopular because of its medizing, and it was considered unfair that she should benefit from DL efforts and protection from piracy unless she became a member.
This use of force/coercion/compulsion was to prove ominous in the future.
In 470, NAXOS, an original member, rebelled. No reason is given by Thuc. He merely says: “After this came the operations against Naxos, which had tried to defect from the Confederacy; it was brought down by siege. This was the first allied state which, in defiance of the covenant, was reduced to the status of a slave.. (I.98.4)
It is uncertain, but likely, that Naxos was forbidden a navy, thus they had to pay tribute. Perhaps a garrison was installed, or land confiscated, or a cleruchy settled on confiscated land (ATL III.156-7). Athens apparently acted with DL approval (see Kagan p.46): “Rebellion could not be allowed or the alliance would soon disintegrate" (p.46). Thuc uses the attack on Naxos for a general account of the change in the nature of the DL, clarifying the fact that Naxos was not the only state in rebellion, and that increasingly harsh treatment of rebels was the rule (Kagan p.46)
Rebellions occurred when members were unwilling or unable to pay tribute, supply ships, or do military service. Athens was strict about tribute collection and exaction of service.
The demeanour of the Athenian commanders also changed, mainly due to circumstances. “The Athenians were no longer equally pleasant as leaders. They no longer bahaved as equals on campaigns, and they found it easy to reduce states that had rebelled,” (Thuc I.99.2)
Rebellions and reductions provided a vicious circle for the allies. Each rebel state was forced to yield a fleet and pay tribute, becoming weaker while Athens grew proportionately stronger. “The Athenian fleet was increased by their payments, while whenever they themselves revolted, they set about the war without preparation and without experience.” (Thuc I.99.3)
Growing allied discontent must have been increased by Kimon’s great victory at EURYMEDON in 469. (Thuc I. 100.1; Plut. Cim 12-14; Diod. Sic. II.60-62). The victory was so decisive, damage so great. booty so considerable, that it led some allies to believe the DL was no longer necessary (Kagan p.47) The Athenians (perhaps correctly) continued as the Persians had not completely abandoned the Aegean. (DS II. 62) The allies became increasingly restive which required greater compulsion from Athens.
In 465, THASOS, a charter member, who was rich and powerful, revolted. (Thuc I.100.2) The causes were different to those of the Naxian revolt. A disagreement with Athens over trading stations on the Thracian coast and a mine there provoked this. As they were rich yields, their loss would be a great economic blow to Athens. Simultaneously, Athens was establishing a colony at ENNEA HODOI (“nine ways”)
Also called AMPHIPOLIS, it was located on a bend in the River Strymon which radiated from here in several directions. It was a DL undertaking and sensibly designed to be a strategic base against the Macedonians, and would also probably extend Athenian influence to Thasos which in turn, led to rebellion. (ATL III.258) The colony was abandoned after a serious defeat by the natives. Thasos withstood a siege for over 2 years, but was defeated and was compelled to surrender:
• Its walls
• Its ships
• The Thracian coast *Thuc I.101.3
• The mine
• They also had to pay an indemnity in the form of tribute (immediately!)
This was the harshest treatment yet imposed. It led to great profit for Athens, yet increased her unpopularity.
The situation of the alliance by 462 was, according to Diodorus Siculus: “In general, the Athenians were making great gains in power and no longer treated their allies with decency as they had done before; instead they ruled with arrogance and violence. For this reason most of the allies could not bear their harshness and spoke to one another of rebellion; some of them even disdained the League Council and acted according to their own wishes.” (DS II.70.3-4)
Implied independence and open defiance were impossible as long as Athens was not distracted. By 462, Athens was in a struggle with Sparta on the mainland. For 15 years Athens was involved in war on land and sea, from Egypt to the eastern Mediterranean to the Greek mainland. In such circumstances, some disaffection was inevitable (Kagan p.48). Under pressure of war and rebellion, Athens resorted to harsher means to assume control. The ultimate outcome of this was EMPIRE.
