Because it's completely ignoring that a perfectly capable natural explanation already exists.
What natural explanation exists for the fine-tuning of the universe that is better than the designer hypothesis?
I agree. I'm fairly sure that he says ID is the best explanation with specific reference to biological complexity. Again, I come back to the fact that evolution explains this perfectly without any need for ID.
I think you may need to read more of Craig's work honestly. I did some digging for you and came across some Q and A's that deal with complications Craig see's specifically with a naturalistic version of evolution (that is to say, it ignores the point that a finely-tuned universe is needed for evolution to even be possible). From these it should be clear that Craig doesn't believe that
naturalistic evolution does provide an air-tight explanation.
Question 82,
Question 84
Please enlighten me on this natural theology, then.
I will be more than happy to once Scorch and I have talked through our remaining issues
Sam Harris does come close to belief in objective morality, although by no means objective in the same sense that God's existence would imply, but again I wouldn't say it's an argument for anything, just as Craig's assertion that without God there is no objective morality isn't really an argument for anything.
I'm unsure of what definitional difference objective morality would have between Craig and Harris's view here. Certainly the implications of objective morality will differ - but in either case they are both still held as objective. Perhaps this is all you meant?
You're correct in my making that assumption. I make it because I regard the scientific explanation as the best explanation, and if such an explanation does not exist then I regard it as unkown. The closest one can get to the truth outside of mathematics is through the scienfitic method, and I see little point in an attempt at a non-scientific explanation while the problem continues to be pursued by scientists.
You are bordering very close to
verificationism with this sort of view. That is, unless something can be empirically verified you regard it as unknowable and thereby also meaningless. The same criticism that has been raised against verificationism can also be raised against your view here. That is, "how do you
know that scientific explanation is the best explanation"? Since the claim is philosophical in nature (and not scientific), your defense will rely on philosophical justification and not scientific explanation. Thus, your original claim becomes self-refuting since if you are able to demonstrate that scientific explanation is the only of knowing, you will have used philosophy to demonstrate that you know this - which refutes the original claim that scientific explanation is the only way of knowing.
And so proposing a sort of
methodological naturalism when looking for best explanations seems too limiting in my opinion. I am quite happy to contend that we may not have
naturalistic explanations for certain phenomenon, but I also do not want to exclude potential explanations simply on the basis that they are not naturalistic - especially if they fit the data well.
It explains the phenomenon at an extremely superficial level, which for me isn't an explanation at all. It seems our definitions of "explanation" are quite different. I argue that it's non-falsifiable because even if a superior natural explanation is discovered, ID can be asserted over the top of it at again a superficial and unneeded level (eg evolution). With this kind of thinking, ID is indeed unfalsifiable.
I would argue that this harks back to the idea that we don't need an explanation of an explanation for it to be considered a valid explanation. Under your use of "extremely superficial" one might also count the law of gravity as an extremely superficial explanation given that we don't have complete explanations for how gravity works.
On your second point, I'm not sure what you're saying really amounts to much against ID. One is not proposing that ID will be unnecessarily added on top of complete working naturalistic explanations. For example, ID proponents don't propose their views in spite of evolution, they propose them precisely
because of deficiencies they see in evolution that would be better explain by ID.
Basically yes. People aren't going to want to pay for expensive scientific endeavours if they are already satisfied with an existing explanation. Again I say that I consider supernatural explanations void because they are inferior to scientific explanations, should they arise, and that in admitting a supernatural explanation (case in point ID) one might as well admit that it's an unkown.
This is not a good criterion for truth on your part. Excluding explanations on the basis of how other people uncritically sustain them is not grounds for them being excluded altogether.
If a scientific explanation exists, then sure, a supernatural explanation will be inferior. There would be no reason for posing one. However if no naturalistic explanation exists, why exclude the possibility of supernatural explanation? Sure, it will be scientifically inexplicable, but we already know that. You need to demonstrate why no supernatural explanation is ever valid. What concerns me is that you seem to be ruling out the supernatural
a priori - that is, it is simply taken or assumed without justification. This is a concern because if anything supernatural does exist (and has casual power), your naturalism has ruled out discovering it without the necessary warrant.
I stand by my statement that ID is unfalsifiable, and while I agree that it's feebleness as an explanation doesn't imply falsity, the mere fact that it is not known for sure does not mean that there is a great, equal, or even small chance of it being true at all. If one is looking for truth, then airy-fairy supernatural explanations are not the way to go. One could easily propose any other supernatural concept and apply it to the same problem and be satisfied with it merely because it provides a very shallow explanation of why something might be so. I needn't go into where this line of selective, largely presumptuous thinking leaves the truth of such statements. This is why I regard all the supernatural explanations I have heard as flat out insufficient., and regard the gap as unkown.
In general an explanation will only go as far as that explanation requires. For example, an argument from design, will only explain the design of the universe. It
won't claim that the explanation requires the designer to be omnipotent, supernatural, omniscient etc. This will greatly limit the amount of other "airy-fairy" explanations that will fit the bill.