Does God exist? (18 Viewers)

[LachieM]

As promised, I just wrapped up a paper on theological fatalism for those interested. It's a quick read (3 pages). I hope it proves to be of some use in clarifying my position.

Thanks very much for this I am reading through it now.

EDIT: Okay I have read through it now. Am I correct in saying that it can be summed up as "God's observation of our free choices is what gives rise to his knowledge of these choices"?

 

[BradCube]

Statements such as this, however:

It is fallacious to infer that x will necessarily happen. It simply will happen. It is entirely possible for x to fail to happen. If it were to fail to happen, God would not have foreknown x to begin with. From God's foreknowledge of x, we can be absolutely certain that x will occur. But, it does not have to occur; it is possible for it to fail to occur.​

... make no sense. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

It makes perfect sense within the context of what you are reading. The reason it does not have to occur and it is possible for it to fail to occur is because the logical order of God's foreknowledge is based on what does in fact happen.

We could replace God's foreknowledge with a true future tense statement in what you quoted and the same result would follow:

"It is fallacious to infer that x will necessarily happen. It simply will happen. It is entirely possible for x to fail to happen. If it were to fail to happen, a future-tense statement regarding x would not have been true to begin with. From a true future-tense statement regarding x, we can be absolutely certain that x will occur. But, it does not have to occur; it is possible for it to fail to occur." (since it is the event that determines the truth and not the truth that determines the event)

What I understood from your previous posts was that you were asserting that simply because God knows x will happen does not presuppose anything about his knowledge of how, why or when it will happen, and that it is entirely possible that he knows if x, y and z occur then one event will happen, and if another combination occur then another event will happen; that is that he understands all possibilities. I found this to be a reasonable way of dealing with this particular problem, which is why I noted that I didn't really find it to be a problem with ideas of a creator, and that there were more serious issues to address.

I maintain that God has middle knowledge meaning he knows what would have been the case if something were different - but this doesn't take away from the fact that he knows what in fact will happen. On the contrary, knowing what "would have" occurred implies that something else "will" occur.

Also, William Lane Craig is an entirely educated fool, and little more than a particularly eloquent idiot, in my reckoning.

These sorts of statements never cease to amaze me - where did your manners and respect go?

 

[BradCube]

Thanks very much for this I am reading through it now.

EDIT: Okay I have read through it now. Am I correct in saying that it can be summed up as "God's observation of our free choices is what gives rise to his knowledge of these choices"?

Observation is probably the wrong word as that could be confused with him observing them in time. But essentially yes, God see's/knows how a person will freely act in the future and thus has foreknowledge of what they will do. His foreknowledge is dependent on their action, not the other way around.

 

[LachieM]

Also, William Lane Craig is an entirely educated fool, and little more than a particularly eloquent idiot, in my reckoning.

I get the impression from some videos I have seen of him that this man supports intelligent design. Very unimpressive.

 

[BradCube]

I get the impression from some videos I have seen of him that this man supports intelligent design. Very unimpressive.

Attack the arguments, not the person who proposes them.

 

[LachieM]

Attack the arguments, not the person who proposes them.

I hardly feel the need to attack ID; it's self-evidently presumptuous and ridiculous. Hardly something I would expect from a man who attacks the New Atheist movement for being "unsophisticated" and the product of "non-critical thinking".

I haven't seen many of his arguments except for those where he is taking on Richard Dawkins' main argument. The arguments he uses are fairly simple but I think they work, sometimes. He does have a point in saying that Dawkins' conclusion of "therefore, God almost definitely does not exist" does not logically follow from the points he made leading up to that, but in combating the points individually he shows a major lack of sophistication.

He criticizes the "the designer must have a designer" argument on the basis that whenever you apply this to anything you will get an infinite regress, which he attests would destroy science. What he fails to realize though is that this is exactly the kind of thinking which progresses science; constant inquiry and questioning. I think the argument is fairly weak also - theists quite easily retort "God is eternal, has no designer, etc", but to his credit, Dawkins takes the next logical step in scientific thinking by questioning the designer, which Craig fails to recognize. Certainly no sign of overly critical analysis here.

Craig goes on to argue that simply because an explanation doesn't itself have an explanation, that explanation isn't automatically void. Fair enough. But again, he displays a distinct lack of the critical thought and scientific inquiry which the phenomena of complex biological life and "fine tuning" (although I don't buy into this argument for a moment) of the universe demands. He then goes on to say that without this restriction of explaining the explanation, it is clear that intelligent design is the best explanation of the complexity of life. Shameful.

I've heard few of his arguments so far, but first impressions certainly aren't good, I must say.

 

[Scorch]

I maintain that God has middle knowledge meaning he knows what would have been the case if something were different - but this doesn't take away from the fact that he knows what in fact will happen. On the contrary, knowing what "would have" occurred implies that something else "will" occur.

I think we're best off leaving this point. It's not one that I find to be most important as far as theism goes and I even suggested a reasonable middle ground that I would argue in my previous post. If you'd like to move on there are some posts on the nature of God and natural evil that you've yet to respond to.

These sorts of statements never cease to amaze me - where did your manners and respect go?

I'm sorry, but the man is little more than an overeducated idiot.

 

[mattd259]

So why would it be wrong to say that reality is derived from his knowledge instead of the other way around? Your argument on how his evidence must be derived from an external source, namely the universe itself, is excluding the fact that he made the universe and thus would know everything about it from the moment of its conception. Indeed, he would've known it before he made the universe, regardless of where his evidence came from, implying that the universe would have to be exactly that way no matter what.

It would be wrong to say that reality is derived from knowledge, because as your epistemological definition of knowlege explains, knowlege is derived from reality. As you explained before, the conditions for knowledge include that there must be evidence for the proposition, and the proposition must be objectively true. As i mentioned previously, evidence must exist external to knowledge, becuase the logical consequence of evidence being derived from knowledge is a circular relationship between cause and effect which can not exist in reality, and so this option can not exist. You somewhat agreed with this previously. So with this in mind, lets suppose that reality really is derived from knowlege. Let's follow the logical consequences.

1. Knowlege is derived from evidence (epistemological definition)
2. Evidence is derived from reality (as explained)
3. Therefore knowlege is derived from reality (logically follows from 1 and 2)

This is an argument for knowledge being derived from reality. There is some reason to believe it. Lets add on the assumption that we are making.

4. Reality is derived from knowledge (supposed)

3 and 4 can not be simulatneously true, because this is circular reasoning. It is a circular relationship between cause and effect. The cause is the reason for the effect, and the effect is the reason for the cause. Supppose you plugged in 4 into 3, just like solving a simulateous equation in maths. knowledge is derived from reality, but reality is derived from knowledge. Therefore knowledge is derived from knowledge....do you see how this gets absolutely nowhere?

Both these statements can not be simulataneously true. At most, only one of the two statements can be true. Which one then, is true? I would say that knowldge is derived from reality. This conlcusion follows directly from the epistemological definition of knowledge which you yourself have given.



I think you are falling into the same trap as before.
-"implying that the universe would have to be exactly that way no matter what"
-"Again, it couldn't have been any other way"
-"the fact that the universe must unfold according to this knowledge is also unavoidable - he cannot conceivably have created it in any other way."
-"The universe must unfold according to this knowledge"

Again, we have to distinguish between what must happen out of neccessity, and what will happen. The difference between the two is that one eliminates all hypotheical universes from even being viable, while the other accepts that there are many possible ways that the universe CAN unfold, but it only WILL unfold one way. There is a big difference.

"I would also agree that the future "can" hypothetically go an infinite number of ways, but ultimately it only will go the one way according to God's knowledge"

Even you agreed before that many futures are possible. So what inclines you now, to imply that only one future is possible? It doesnt even logically follow from what you have previously said.

Lastly, I dont see how addressing the fact that God knew the universe even at its conception makes the argument any different. you say that since God's knowledge extended back to the universe's creation, God created the universe such that it corresponded to his knowledge. But this refers back to the same problem, of whether reality came from God's knowlege or if knowledge came from reality. You say that God created the universe based on his knowledge, which is saying that reality came from knwoledge. Even at the the beggining of the universe, i think my argument stands. God decided to create the universe, and as a consequence of creating it, he knows everything about it.

I'm sorry if i get a bit repetitive, but the argument itself is quite repetitive, and i dont have the vocabulary to make it seem that much more interesting.

 

[BradCube]

No, I'm not. I'll try and clarify here; I'm not stating that God doesn't exist as a matter of fact. I am stating that there is no objective evidence that God exists. This is acknowledged by both of us. From there, I am saying that it is not unreasonable to believe he probably doesn't exist, as we take that rational approach to almost every other deity and scientific concept. I add that, when there is no evidence to suggest that an entity exists, it is rational not to claim knowledge that one possibly cannot have (that such an entity exists).

Still, I think you are claiming more than what you 'ought. Being able to assert that “God probably doesn’t exist” requires you have more than a lack of evidence supporting God’s existence. You claim that “we take that rational approach to almost every other deity and scientific concept” but I am not inclined to agree. You will remember that I posted a scheme that outlined what I thought were rational grounds for affirming the non-existence of an entity.

A person (x) is warranted in believing in the non existence of e if:

1) e is such that if it existed then we would expect to find evidence (or any other epistemic grounding for belief) of e's existence
2) x, justifiably believes they are in a good epistemic position to search and examine for such evidence
3) x finds no such evidence, evidence contrary or evidence improbable with regard to the existence of e

Unless you feel there is something wrong with the above, I would ask you on what grounds you think “God probably doesn’t exist” within the proposed scheme.

Also, I have not agreed that I think there is no objective evidence that God exists. On the contrary, I have affirmed that I find good grounds for affirming God’s existence especially from within the framework of natural theology.

Can you attempt to explain to me why an omnipotent God would need to kill 200,000 poor, East Asian peasants, most of whom aren't Christian so are going to hell as far as Christianity is concerned (thus there is no reward in any next life either), in order to do anything?

Again, let me remind you that the onus is on you at the moment to show how my proposed 4th solution is not possible. It’s not enough to simply ask “why would God allow (x)?”. You need to be able to show that God could have prevented (x) and that an equal or greater number of people over the course of history (both past and future) would have come into relationship with Him and be raised as responsible moral agents.

All that needs to be said in regard to your problem is that it is conceivably possible that God could use an event such as the tsunami to bring more people into a relationship with Him throughout the course of history than otherwise. As long as this is even possible (it doesn’t even need to be likely), then you cannot claim this to be an invalid option. You need to make sure you look at all events in their relevant place in history and not in isolation. Under this model, it could be the flow on effects throughout the course of history (think butterfly effect) that have more purpose in God’s mind than the event itself.

He wouldn't That the drawback of omnipotence, you don't need to do anything in order to accomplish anything. There is nothing that forces God to use human suffering in order to do anything, as he is omnipotent and could thus accomplish it without human suffering.

If people have genuine free will and Gods greatest good is helping them become responsible moral agents whilst also being in a relationship with him then it is not at all clear that this could be achieved without human suffering. God’s omnipotence doesn’t allow him to do that which is logically impossible. Forcing people to do something freely is logically impossible. And so I would submit that it is possible for God to use suffering as a means of creating circumstances in which more people will be freely worked towards God’s greatest good.

The fact that he apparently regularly chooses to do things via human suffering when he is omnipotent and thus entirely capable of doing things without the suffering of his powerless creations is irreconcilable with any idea of God being benevolent.

If what I have stated is true, then it is not at all the case that God is “entirely capable” of doing things without suffering since this could involve a logical impossibility.

I think we're best off leaving this point. It's not one that I find to be most important as far as theism goes and I even suggested a reasonable middle ground that I would argue in my previous post. If you'd like to move on there are some posts on the nature of God and natural evil that you've yet to respond to.

Apologies, for not replying to the earlier posts before – I spent most of yesterday finishing that paper and then quickly replying to some of the first reactions last night. I wasn't ignoring you

I am happy to leave it as long as you are willing to concede that there is no logical incompatibility between Gods foreknowledge and our having free will.

I'm sorry, but the man is little more than an overeducated idiot.

Again, attack the arguments and not the person proposing them. You do yourself no favours in attacking someone personally – it’s out of place in academic discussion.

 

[Scorch]

Still, I think you are claiming more than what you 'ought. Being able to assert that “God probably doesn’t exist” requires you have more than a lack of evidence supporting God’s existence. You claim that “we take that rational approach to almost every other deity and scientific concept” but I am not inclined to agree. You will remember that I posted a scheme that outlined what I thought were rational grounds for affirming the non-existence of an entity.

If I am claiming more that I ought, then anyone claiming that God exists is claiming far more than they ought, anyone that claims they know about his workings and interactions with our world even more so, and anyone that claims that the overwhelming majority of what we need to know is contained in a historically inaccurate book of scientificic fallacies and violence from the early Iron Age is absolutely insane.

Unless you feel there is something wrong with the above, I would ask you on what grounds you think “God probably doesn’t exist” within the proposed scheme.

I think your original premise is wrong, as you assume that the natural and logical assumption is to assume that God exists and work from there. Again, I feel the discussion would be better served by moving on from these premises. If you feel different I am happy to continue discussion on the topic, but I feel the most fruitful discussion between us has occurred on the actual characteristics of God, as opposed to the semantics of the presupposition of belief/non-belief.

Also, I have not agreed that I think there is no objective evidence that God exists. On the contrary, I have affirmed that I find good grounds for affirming God’s existence especially from within the framework of natural theology.

That's not objective evidence. That's self-referential thinking, inserting God into entirely functioning, closed logical explanations by virtue of wishful thinking.

Again, let me remind you that the onus is on you at the moment to show how my proposed 4th solution is not possible. It’s not enough to simply ask “why would God allow (x)?”. You need to be able to show that God could have prevented (x) and that an equal or greater number of people over the course of history (both past and future) would have come into relationship with Him and be raised as responsible moral agents.

All that needs to be said in regard to your problem is that it is conceivably possible that God could use an event such as the tsunami to bring more people into a relationship with Him throughout the course of history than otherwise. As long as this is even possible (it doesn’t even need to be likely), then you cannot claim this to be an invalid option. You need to make sure you look at all events in their relevant place in history and not in isolation. Under this model, it could be the flow on effects throughout the course of history (think butterfly effect) that have more purpose in God’s mind than the event itself.

Not at all. If God is omnipotent, then whatever goal he had in mind by allowing the destruction of 200,000 East-Asian peasants could have been achieved without this destruction. Period. God does not have to use any means to achieve anything, he is omnipotent.

If he is omnipotent, then he is able to use any means to achieve his noble goals. There is no force in the universe for which he is not directly responsible that limits the means by which he may accomplish such things. You'll see I've elaborated on this further down.

If people have genuine free will and Gods greatest good is helping them become responsible moral agents whilst also being in a relationship with him then it is not at all clear that this could be achieved without human suffering. God’s omnipotence doesn’t allow him to do that which is logically impossible. Forcing people to do something freely is logically impossible. And so I would submit that it is possible for God to use suffering as a means of creating circumstances in which more people will be freely worked towards God’s greatest good.

If what I have stated is true, then it is not at all the case that God is “entirely capable” of doing things without suffering since this could involve a logical impossibility.

That's a poor logical leap; I don't quite understand why the goal of "helping them become responsible moral agents whilst also being in a relationship with him" could not be achieved without the slaughter en masse of other helpless creations; God is omnipotent. He is not limited by requirements or prerequisites. If he is forced to work within a framework of human nature by which humanity is forced to experience vicarious suffering in order to understand his place in God's plan, then that is a framework that is entirely of his own creation.

The only way that such slaughter can be justified is if God has no other way to achieve his noble ends. However he is omnipotent, so any restrictions by way of human nature or the nature of the earth are entirely of his own creation. So either God is omnipotent and [a] chooses violent slaughter of innocents as his preferred method of bringing people to know him in certain circumstances where there are other options or is limited solely to enacting such goals through slaughter of innocents, in which case such limits are entirely of his own creation.

So, as proposed earlier, the only option that we can consider that means God is able to remain omni-benevolent in this scenario is if he is not omnipotent.

I am happy to leave it as long as you are willing to concede that there is no logical incompatibility between Gods foreknowledge and our having free will.

As I said several posts back:

What I understood from your previous posts was that you were asserting that simply because God knows x will happen does not presuppose anything about his knowledge of how, why or when it will happen, and that it is entirely possible that he knows if x, y and z occur then one event will happen, and if another combination occur then another event will happen; that is that he understands all possibilities. I found this to be a reasonable way of dealing with this particular problem, which is why I noted that I didn't really find it to be a problem with ideas of a creator, and that there were more serious issues to address.​

Again, attack the arguments and not the person proposing them. You do yourself no favours in attacking someone personally – it’s out of place in academic discussion.

Well this is hardly an academic discussion, though I appreciate the thought you put into your posts

 

[LachieM]

It would be wrong to say that reality is derived from knowledge, because as your epistemological definition of knowlege explains, knowlege is derived from reality. As you explained before, the conditions for knowledge include that there must be evidence for the proposition, and the proposition must be objectively true. As i mentioned previously, evidence must exist external to knowledge, becuase the logical consequence of evidence being derived from knowledge is a circular relationship between cause and effect which can not exist in reality, and so this option can not exist. You somewhat agreed with this previously. So with this in mind, lets suppose that reality really is derived from knowlege. Let's follow the logical consequences.

1. Knowlege is derived from evidence (epistemological definition)
2. Evidence is derived from reality (as explained)
3. Therefore knowlege is derived from reality (logically follows from 1 and 2)

This is an argument for knowledge being derived from reality. There is some reason to believe it. Lets add on the assumption that we are making.

4. Reality is derived from knowledge (supposed)

3 and 4 can not be simulatneously true, because this is circular reasoning. It is a circular relationship between cause and effect. The cause is the reason for the effect, and the effect is the reason for the cause. Supppose you plugged in 4 into 3, just like solving a simulateous equation in maths. knowledge is derived from reality, but reality is derived from knowledge. Therefore knowledge is derived from knowledge....do you see how this gets absolutely nowhere?

I see what you mean, although I would argue that a special exception to this would have to be made for God, merely because he not only knows reality but also created it, so this cyclical relationship can be sustained. Furthermore, an omniscient God, I would argue, hardly requirhave never used the definition of knowledge to restrict God, as you seem to be doing - after all we started with the assumption that he is omniscient, removing any need to explain this omniscience. I use the definition merely as a tool to deduce the consequences of omniscience.

I think you are falling into the same trap as before.
-"implying that the universe would have to be exactly that way no matter what"
-"Again, it couldn't have been any other way"
-"the fact that the universe must unfold according to this knowledge is also unavoidable - he cannot conceivably have created it in any other way."
-"The universe must unfold according to this knowledge"

Yes, although I wouldn't call it a trap.

Again, we have to distinguish between what must happen out of neccessity, and what will happen. The difference between the two is that one eliminates all hypotheical universes from even being viable, while the other accepts that there are many possible ways that the universe CAN unfold, but it only WILL unfold one way. There is a big difference.

I understand this also, and I understand the distinction between the two. I am merely arguing that in this case, there is no distinction to be made. I shall explain in a sec.

"I would also agree that the future "can" hypothetically go an infinite number of ways, but ultimately it only will go the one way according to God's knowledge"

Even you agreed before that many futures are possible. So what inclines you now, to imply that only one future is possible? It doesnt even logically follow from what you have previously said.

Hypothetically possible in the sense that one can ponder what may have happened had one gone left rather than right. I am not implying here that the "left" road was ever existent to choose from in any real sense though, this would indeed be contradictory to my argument.

Lastly, I dont see how addressing the fact that God knew the universe even at its conception makes the argument any different. you say that since God's knowledge extended back to the universe's creation, God created the universe such that it corresponded to his knowledge. But this refers back to the same problem, of whether reality came from God's knowlege or if knowledge came from reality. You say that God created the universe based on his knowledge, which is saying that reality came from knwoledge. Even at the the beggining of the universe, i think my argument stands. God decided to create the universe, and as a consequence of creating it, he knows everything about it.

I think this is the main point where we diverge. I understand your point and the logic behind it perfectly, I just think it works another way. I cannot for the life of me see any way around it. God creates the universe with knowledge of how it will unfold, and naturally creates it to reflect this, it is impossible to do otherwise. Thus there is only the one way for it to unfold. The universe and everything in it is bound by time, and due to God's knowledge there is only one path to be taken through time. This is the bit that gets me. For me this implies one path with no offshoots or branches or anything. In this scenario, there is clearly no distinction to be made between "will" and "must"; both apply. We are invariably fixed to a single future before the universe even begins, which is a direct result of God's omniscience.

I'm sorry if i get a bit repetitive, but the argument itself is quite repetitive, and i dont have the vocabulary to make it seem that much more interesting.

I am feeling the same way to be honest. I doubt we're going to get much further with this, although it was fun while it lasted. Has certainly been an eye-opener for me.

 

[BradCube]

I hardly feel the need to attack ID; it's self-evidently presumptuous and ridiculous. Hardly something I would expect from a man who attacks the New Atheist movement for being "unsophisticated" and the product of "non-critical thinking".

Care to share what it is that makes ID self-evidently presumptuous and ridiculous? It doesn’t seem all that self-evident to me.

He criticizes the "the designer must have a designer" argument on the basis that whenever you apply this to anything you will get an infinite regress, which he attests would destroy science. What he fails to realize though is that this is exactly the kind of thinking which progresses science; constant inquiry and questioning. I think the argument is fairly weak also - theists quite easily retort "God is eternal, has no designer, etc", but to his credit, Dawkins takes the next logical step in scientific thinking by questioning the designer, which Craig fails to recognize. Certainly no sign of overly critical analysis here.

Craig and almost all theists propose God’s existence as necessary. Questioning the cause of a necessary being’s existence by definition doesn’t make good sense.

Proposing an infinite regress of causes is not something which progresses science (since an infinite regress is impossible). Being consistently open to inquiry and discovery in areas where science is apt progresses the discipline.

Even then, Craig is not making a case for scientific method, he is arguing for what is true about reality and this will fall back to the task of philosophy (in conjunction with premises that rely on scientifically verifiable data, but philosophy nevertheless)

Craig goes on to argue that simply because an explanation doesn't itself have an explanation, that explanation isn't automatically void. Fair enough. But again, he displays a distinct lack of the critical thought and scientific inquiry which the phenomena of complex biological life and "fine tuning" (although I don't buy into this argument for a moment) of the universe demands. He then goes on to say that without this restriction of explaining the explanation, it is clear that intelligent design is the best explanation of the complexity of life. Shameful.

I’m confused as to what the real issue is here? You seem to be saying on one had that you agree that an explanation of a phenomenon doesn’t itself require explanation, but then complain because ID is proposed? Generally Craig’s arguments for fine tuning will take a form similar to this:

1. The “fine-tuning” of the universe is either due to physical necessity, chance or design
2. It is not due to either physical necessity or chance
3. Therefore it is due to design

What Craig seems to be saying is that we don’t require an explanation of whatever the designer was/is. All we need to be able to identify is that it is the best explanation.

Also, Craig doesn’t argue for the “complexity of life” but for the complexity and fine tuning of the universe as a whole.

 

[BradCube]

If I am claiming more that I ought, then anyone claiming that God exists is claiming far more than they ought, anyone that claims they know about his workings and interactions with our world even more so, and anyone that claims that the overwhelming majority of what we need to know is contained in a historically inaccurate book of scientificic fallacies and violence from the early Iron Age is absolutely insane.

Theists will claim that they do have reasons for proposing God’s existence so I am not to inclined to agree with you from the outset. On the other hand, you are claiming that the lack of reasons for proposing God existence is itself reason for proposing his non-existence – I can’t help but feel that without some extra qualification this jump is unjustified. You should be left with bare agnosticism instead.

I think your original premise is wrong, as you assume that the natural and logical assumption is to assume that God exists and work from there. Again, I feel the discussion would be better served by moving on from these premises. If you feel different I am happy to continue discussion on the topic, but I feel the most fruitful discussion between us has occurred on the actual characteristics of God, as opposed to the semantics of the presupposition of belief/non-belief.

I would definitely prefer to continue as you seem to trying to palm off any need for justification regarding your positive claim to knowledge. As far as I can tell, if I as a theist take on a burden of justification when asserting that God does exists, you too share a similar burden of justification when asserting that God does not exist.

Premise (1) stated:

1. (e) is such that if it existed then we would expect to find evidence (or any other epistemic grounding for belief) of (e)'s existence

I am not sure why you think that this assumes “that the natural and logical assumption is to assume that God exists and work from there”. It simply says that if we want to disaffirm God’s existence, God would be such that you would expect to find evidence of his existence (if He did in fact exist). Even if it were the case that we wouldn’t expect evidence of God's existence, this says nothing about then assuming that He does exist. This qualifier, if unmet leaves us in a state of agnosticism, not theism.

That's not objective evidence. That's self-referential thinking, inserting God into entirely functioning, closed logical explanations by virtue of wishful thinking.

We can debate the merits of natural theology when we get to it, although it must be noted that I wholeheartedly disagree with you.

Nevertheless it is still the case that I am affirming reasons exist for proposing God’s existence. This is in contrast to your antithetical belief based on a mere lack of reasons.

Not at all. If God is omnipotent, then whatever goal he had in mind by allowing the destruction of 200,000 East-Asian peasants could have been achieved without this destruction. Period. God does not have to use any means to achieve anything, he is omnipotent.
If he is omnipotent, then he is able to use any means to achieve his noble goals. There is no force in the universe for which he is not directly responsible that limits the means by which he may accomplish such things. You'll see I've elaborated on this further down.

Again, this will hark back to freewill. Under my proposed model, our freewill is a limiting factor on God’s ability to bring about His greatest good since it is impossible to make anyone do something freely. This doesn’t equate to a lack of omnipotence any more than God’s inability to create a married bachelor - it’s just working within the realms of logical necessity.

Sure, God could have created a world in which all 200,000 people didn’t even exist, but this may not be the way to achieve the greatest good.

That's a poor logical leap; I don't quite understand why the goal of "helping them become responsible moral agents whilst also being in a relationship with him" could not be achieved without the slaughter en masse of other helpless creations; God is omnipotent. He is not limited by requirements or prerequisites. If he is forced to work within a framework of human nature by which humanity is forced to experience vicarious suffering in order to understand his place in God's plan, then that is a framework that is entirely of his own creation.

Not quite. If what I am proposing is coherent then the framework God is limited by (our freewill) is not “entirely of his own creation”, it is out of logical necessity – an extension of His nature. Proposing that God is not omnipotent because he is limited by logic is no defeater since theists do not typically propose that His omnipotence includes any such ability.

The only way that such slaughter can be justified is if God has no other way to achieve his noble ends. However he is omnipotent, so any restrictions by way of human nature or the nature of the earth are entirely of his own creation. So either God is omnipotent and [a] chooses violent slaughter of innocents as his preferred method of bringing people to know him in certain circumstances where there are other options or is limited solely to enacting such goals through slaughter of innocents, in which case such limits are entirely of his own creation.

So, as proposed earlier, the only option that we can consider that means God is able to remain omni-benevolent in this scenario is if he is not omnipotent.

This is exactly what I am proposing is possible. Freewill means there could be no other way to “achieve his noble ends”. Freewill is a necessary component of God bringing about his greatest good and this means it presents a limitation on God out of logical necessity. Such a limitation does not hamper God’s omnipotence since omnipotence does not include the ability to do that which is logically impossible.

As I said several posts back:
What I understood from your previous posts was that you were asserting that simply because God knows x will happen does not presuppose anything about his knowledge of how, why or when it will happen, and that it is entirely possible that he knows if x, y and z occur then one event will happen, and if another combination occur then another event will happen; that is that he understands all possibilities. I found this to be a reasonable way of dealing with this particular problem, which is why I noted that I didn't really find it to be a problem with ideas of a creator, and that there were more serious issues to address.

So I’ll take that as a ‘yes’ that you agree there is no contradiction between foreknowledge and freewill?

 

[Scorch]

Theists will claim that they do have reasons for proposing God’s existence so I am not to inclined to agree with you from the outset. On the other hand, you are claiming that the lack of reasons for proposing God existence is itself reason for proposing his non-existence – I can’t help but feel that without some extra qualification this jump is unjustified. You should be left with bare agnosticism instead

I would definitely prefer to continue as you seem to trying to palm off any need for justification regarding your positive claim to knowledge. As far as I can tell, if I as a theist take on a burden of justification when asserting that God does exists, you too share a similar burden of justification when asserting that God does not exist.

Premise (1) stated:

1. (e) is such that if it existed then we would expect to find evidence (or any other epistemic grounding for belief) of (e)'s existence

I am not sure why you think that this assumes “that the natural and logical assumption is to assume that God exists and work from there”. It simply says that if we want to disaffirm God’s existence, God would be such that you would expect to find evidence of his existence (if He did in fact exist). Even if it were the case that we wouldn’t expect evidence of God's existence, this says nothing about then assuming that He does exist. This qualifier, if unmet leaves us in a state of agnosticism, not theism.

Again, I shall keep stating (to my eventual frustration) that I have not at all claimed God does not exist as a matter of fact. If you are to question the consistency of my logic then you should suppose, for such purposes, that subjective/wishful interpretations of entirely natural phenomena ought not be considered as 'evidence' for the existence of any deity.

As a result, the logical position is that such an entity could exist, but it is impossible to know anything meaningful regarding his nature. The important note to be made is that one should not claim knowledge that one has no means of possessing. I therefore hold that any specific claim about any supernatural deity or his nature is a claim to knowledge that no human could possibly possess.

To leave that point hanging, we must dwell on the superficial differences between theism and deism. Theism claims, as opposed to deism, to know the more personal characteristics, aims, nature and wishes of such an entity. As stated above, I find such claims to be in contrast to a logical position of only claiming knowledge that one is actually able to possess, and thus meaningless in terms of what we can actually know about such an entity. It is important to note, as well, that the most important claims as to this nature are made by Islam, Christianity and Judaism, all of which are based on several thousand year old texts with no end of basic historical, factual and scientific mistakes and betray human, political motives and propaganda in their nature. The reason I note this is that such a fact means that the very idea that they are divinely 'inspired' (and thus immune to processes of logic as to what a human could rationally know and claim) stretches the imagination and credulity of a rational person considerably.

It is this knowledge of God's nature, personality, aims and wishes that I reject; this theistic claim to knowledge, hence my position is naturally atheistic.

So, as I have said several times, I do not make a positive claim and say that God does not exist. What I do say is that theism is the branch of thought that attributes such specific ideology to such a being, and that given the origin and nature of such claims, such attribution is meaningless.

As far as this leaves me in terms of personal belief. I agree that a supernatural deity may or may not exist while I think that no human may claim any meaningful knowledge of his nature. Furthermore, scientific understanding of the observable universe has progressed such that such an entity is no longer necessary to such an understanding as it was in the past.

In this sense, belief in such a deity (separate to religion/theism; deism) is, again, a positive claim that cannot be verified (i.e. that God exists), yet it is less irrational than theistic belief in that it does not claim specific knowledge of his nature, intentions and thoughts.

We then come full circle, in that the only difference between a Deist and I would be not in our understanding of the possibilities of the existence of such a deity but rather the most rational way to interpret incidental evidence, in which case a far more meaningful dialogue can be established (as opposed to one between such a position and religion).

Again, this will hark back to freewill. Under my proposed model, our freewill is a limiting factor on God’s ability to bring about His greatest good since it is impossible to make anyone do something freely. This doesn’t equate to a lack of omnipotence any more than God’s inability to create a married bachelor - it’s just working within the realms of logical necessity.

Sure, God could have created a world in which all 200,000 people didn’t even exist, but this may not be the way to achieve the greatest good.

Not quite. If what I am proposing is coherent then the framework God is limited by (our freewill) is not “entirely of his own creation”, it is out of logical necessity – an extension of His nature. Proposing that God is not omnipotent because he is limited by logic is no defeater since theists do not typically propose that His omnipotence includes any such ability.

This is exactly what I am proposing is possible. Freewill means there could be no other way to “achieve his noble ends”. Freewill is a necessary component of God bringing about his greatest good and this means it presents a limitation on God out of logical necessity. Such a limitation does not hamper God’s omnipotence since omnipotence does not include the ability to do that which is logically impossible.

I don't think that free will enters into it in the slightest. God, again, is acting within any parameters that he creates. Even if one were to agree that free-will is somehow a necessity, as opposed to something that God has endowed us with, that by no means closes any gap. What this recognizes is that God must then influence his creations in other ways than sheer omnipotent force.

The only way that one could then close such a gap is to argue that an omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omniscient God would be:

1. Unable, due to the logical consistency of free will, to force his creations to do anything.
2. He would then be forced to turn to other measures in order to influence his creations and bring about his 'greater good'.
3. Humanity was created such that the only way (because if there were others and God was choosing an extremely violent and painful one, that would make him capricious) that they are able to appreciate any such sense of greater good is by vicariously experiencing, in one form or another, the slaughter, en masse, of their fellow human beings.

Point 3 is a serious problem in such an assertion. God, as an omnipotent creator, is responsible for every single facet of the nature of humanity, he is also aware of all future potentialities (leaving the idea of free will aside for a second). That means that God, in creating humanity with such emotional limitation, was entirely aware that the only way he would be able to make them into such "responsible moral agents" would be to systematically and consistently allow them to be slaughtered by the natural forces of the world for millions of years; I find this to be capricious at worst and negligent at worst.

Accepting free will being as you say it is, it remains that any emotional limitation that makes such slaughter necessary in order to facilitate moral human behaviour (which I find laughable in itself) is one of God's own creation.

So I’ll take that as a ‘yes’ that you agree there is no contradiction between foreknowledge and freewill?

Sure, if you want. I'd rather you just take what I said as a yes to the fact that I agree to what I said, but if you must then yes.

 

[LachieM]

Care to share what it is that makes ID self-evidently presumptuous and ridiculous? It doesn’t seem all that self-evident to me.

It's ridiculous because it's putting God where he isn't needed. We have a perfectly capable, natural theory for life's physical intricacies, evolution, and proposing ID doesn't help anywhere. It's presumptuous because claiming support of ID in this area is equivalent to saying "I dont like the theory of evolution, but thankfully I believe in God so I can assume he did it all".

Craig and almost all theists propose God’s existence as necessary. Questioning the cause of a necessary being’s existence by definition doesn’t make good sense.

Proposing an infinite regress of causes is not something which progresses science (since an infinite regress is impossible). Being consistently open to inquiry and discovery in areas where science is apt progresses the discipline.

Even then, Craig is not making a case for scientific method, he is arguing for what is true about reality and this will fall back to the task of philosophy (in conjunction with premises that rely on scientifically verifiable data, but philosophy nevertheless)

Of course they do. And frankly I see no reason to.

What Craig proposes is for all questioning to stop with the existence of God. "Why explain further? We have a perfect system here to explain everything." This is exactly the kind of attitude which ultimately causes religion to come second to science in explaining phenomenon. While an infinite regress does not itself directly assist science, the question and inquiry involved at each step is exactly what science is about. Why do you think physicists are so intent on discovering some explanation for gravity? Because they don't think Newton's and Einstein's ideas are sufficient in explaining the cause of the phenomenon itself. They don't simply kick up their feet and say "well these seem to do nicely there's no point going further, that would cause an infinite regress and destroy science".

Not a case for the scientific method, although he certainly inclues the paradigm as part of his argument to show the supposed severity of this questioning. I've seen him do it twice now, once in that "I'm refuting Dawkins" video and again in a debate with Christopher Hitchens. The man should know better.

I’m confused as to what the real issue is here? You seem to be saying on one had that you agree that an explanation of a phenomenon doesn’t itself require explanation, but then complain because ID is proposed? Generally Craig’s arguments for fine tuning will take a form similar to this:

1. The “fine-tuning” of the universe is either due to physical necessity, chance or design
2. It is not due to either physical necessity or chance
3. Therefore it is due to design

What Craig seems to be saying is that we don’t require an explanation of whatever the designer was/is. All we need to be able to identify is that it is the best explanation.

Also, Craig doesn’t argue for the “complexity of life” but for the complexity and fine tuning of the universe as a whole.

Again, this is just God of the gaps. I see no scientific inquiry here. I see three possibilities, which I concede are set out and eliminated logically , but the end result is still "we don't have a natural explanation for it yet so God did it". The claim of fine tuning in the universe absolutely is a scientific claim and as such should be treated as a subset of the scientific sphere.

God fits the hole perfectly, granted, but is this practically the best explanation? No. It doesn't further our knowledge to any practical degree, so until we have a working, natural explanation for this, (if ever we do), I am content to say that I don't know. It was similarly argued in the past (and still is, even by Craig) that evolution is not the best explanation for life, at least not in it's purely natural form. Evolution still has its quirks; there is some small debate as to the exact mechanisms through which evolution actually occurs, but God again seems to fit the bill perfectly. What practical advances has the ID explanation here made? None. An understanding of evolution, on the other hand, has provided us with a greater understanding of viruses and immunities for greater efficiency in treating virus victims etc. If one is to have any explanation of the world, then I think it best to adopt that which has some scientific merit, as such implies it may eventually have some practical application. Settling for the God hypothesis is equivalent to saying, for all intents and purposes "I don't know", the only difference being that the God hypothesis for many people is all that is needed, and scientific inquiry is thus considered unnecessary by such people. There is nothing at all helpful about this.

Craig does say ID trumps evolution in both videos I have seen of him so far (his debate with Hitchens and his deconstruction of Dawkins' arguments). I don't care for this whatsoever.

 

[Scorch]

God fits the hole perfectly, granted

No, God is made to fit the hole. The Christian God, for example, in no way fits the gap, in any way. A vague deistic God can be made to fit into the gap beacuse it is unconnected to any pre-existing dogma.

 

[LachieM]

No, God is made to fit the hole. The Christian God, for example, in no way fits the gap, in any way. A vague deistic God can be made to fit into the gap beacuse it is unconnected to any pre-existing dogma.

Which is exactly why he fits it. The conception of the Christian God can be adapted to explain most of these things, and is, (see: every attempt at the Christian God being used to explain natural phenomena) as long as he stays omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent. I think it's an extremely poor explanation, in fact I hardly regard it as an explanation at all, but it works because like you said it is made to work.

 

[Scorch]

Which is exactly why he fits it. The conception of the Christian God can be adapted to explain most of these things, and is, (see: every attempt at the Christian God being used to explain natural phenomena) as long as he stays omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent. I think it's an extremely poor explanation, in fact I hardly regard it as an explanation at all, but it works because like you said it is made to work.

Well it depends on whether you can still call it the Christian God when you consider the amount that they must disregard the Christian Bible in order to arrive at such a picture.

 

[trickx]

William Lane Craig ...

hahaha ahhh yes, a sophisticated debater and dishonest intellectual.

All his arguments are assumed on cosmological evidence that is almost always changing and revised. He accepts them because it favours his arguments for the existence of a deity.

However, when it comes to biology .. evolution specifically, he refuses to accept it as a scientific principle. Probably because of the huge implications it is going to have on his theology.

He's a dishonest prick and refuses to debate his former students like John Loftus because he knows they'll tear up his rubbish arguments.

Wayyy too overrated theologian.

 

[LachieM]

Well it depends on whether you can still call it the Christian God when you consider the amount that they must disregard the Christian Bible in order to arrive at such a picture.

Disregard or willfully misinterpret. I think the second of those is the more common. Whether or not the explanation accurately reflects the Christian God is not something I care to comment on.